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Punitive House Demolitions, the Prohibition
of Collective Punishment, and the Supreme
Court of Israel
Shane Darcy*
1.

Introduction

The relationship between an Occupying Power and the local
population under its control is somewhat unnatural. Pursuant to the laws
of occupation, an Occupying Power has almost complete authority over
the local population and that population must for all intents and purposes
accept that dominance.
The relationship between Israel and the
population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip since 1967 has been strained
at the best of times. International humanitarian law seeks to regulate this
relationship, by guaranteeing the rights of the population under
occupation, while taking into account the genuine security concerns of
the Occupying Power. Striking the correct balance between these two
has often proved elusive in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Israel has been reluctant to accept the full applicability in the
Occupied Territories of international humanitarian law, in particular the
rules set out in the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.1 Post-Oslo, Israel might
argue that it has relinquished much of its responsibility in parts of the
Occupied Territories and thus its obligations under international human
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rights law do not extend to those areas. 2 The cumulative effect is that
Israel effectively denies the justiciability of many of the rights accruing
to the Palestinian population in the Occupied Territories under
international law. Frequently, this has translated into a misapplication of
the powers of the occupying army, often in the form of actions taken in
response to Palestinian violence, by the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF).
The ongoing practice of demolishing houses as a punitive measure
for actual or suspected unlawful activity is a case in point. This article
will examine Israel's controversial house demolition policy in light of the
State's obligations under international law. In particular, these actions
will be assessed with regard to the legal prohibition of acts of collective
punishment. Section II will examine the domestic legal basis relied upon
by Israel for house demolitions. Section III will then set out the
prohibition of collective punishment under international law. Following
this, Section IV will explore the case-law -of the Supreme Court of Israel
which has addressed the house demolition issue. The final section of this
article will ask whether these house demolitions in the Occupied
Territories amount to serious violations of international law.
A.

Empiricaldata relatingto punitive house demolitions andsealings

Exact figures for the number of punitive house demolitions which
were carried out during the first half of Israel's occupation of the West
Bank and Gaza are unavailable, although it is widely known that the
Israeli authorities employed this sanction extensively. A variety of
sources point to the widespread use of house demolitions as a means of
punishment during these early years. The former Israeli Defence
Minister, Moshe Dayan, told the Knesset that 516 houses had been
demolished, expropriated or sealed between June 1967 and December 1,
1969. 3 The International Committee of the Red Cross reported in 1978
that 1,224 houses had been demolished since 1967, a thousand of which
had taken place in the first five years of the occupation.4 The number of
demolitions dropped during the mid 1970s and approximately one
hundred houses were demolished or sealed from this time until the early

2.

For a discussion on the applicability of international human rights law, see

discussion in CHRISTINE BELL, PEACE AGREEMENTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 80-81 (2000).
See also Adam Roberts, Prolonged Military Occupation: The Israeli-Occupied
Territories 1967 - 1988, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES 25, 53-57 (Emma Playfair ed., 1992).
3. Cited in ESTHER ROSALIND COHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ISRAELI-OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES; 1967-1982 96 (1985).
4.
EMMA PLAYFAIR, DEMOLITION
OCCUPIED WEST 1 (1987).

AND SEALING OF HOUSES

IN THE ISRAELI-
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1980s. 5 As Table 1.1 demonstrates, demolitions and sealings became
much more frequent in the period beginning in 1985. With the onset of
the first intifada at the end of 1987, the Israeli authorities escalated the
implementation of the punitive house demolition policy with
considerable fervor.
Between 1987 and the end of the first intifada the Israeli authorities
completely demolished nearly four hundred houses and either partially
demolished, sealed or partially sealed another four hundred as
punishment. The demolition policy employed by Israel during the first
intifada led to the destruction or putting beyond use of over 3,500
individual rooms and caused the displacement of approximately eight
thousand Palestinians.6 Use of demolitions as a punitive measure waned
with the falling levels of violent resistance during the mid 1990s, to the
point where no demolitions or sealings were carried out between 1998
and 2000. During 2001 and over the course of the past year, the Israeli
authorities have once again renewed their punitive house demolition
policy in the face of the violence of the second intifada. From August
2002 to March 2003 the army carried out over two hundred punitive
house demolitions in the West Bank and Gaza.7 This represents the
highest number of demolitions in such a short period for over a decade.
There is an unsettling difference in Israel's demolition policy
between the two intifadas. Since the resumption of this policy during the
second intifada, the Israeli authorities have favored the most severe
sanction of total demolition. Taking the figures in the table into account,
it is clear that whereas during the first intifada 57% of those houses
affected were demolished, either completely or partially, during the
second intifada 98% of houses affected have been totally demolished.
There have only been three cases of houses being sealed and one of
partial demolition in the past two years. The number of demolitions has
not yet reached the level witnessed during the first intifada, although
recent months in particular have shown a marked increase in the use of
demolitions as a means of punishment. Opting for complete demolition
over the less harsh, and reversible, sanction of sealing displays a
worrying trend in the Israeli authorities employment of this policy.

5.
AL-HAQ, PUNISHING A NATION: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
PALESTINIAN UPRISING, DECEMBER 1987 - DECEMBER 1988 (1989).

6. Source: AI-Haq database.
7. See
B'tselem,
available
http://www.btselem.org/english/HouseDemolitions/Statistics.asp
(last
2003).
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Table 1.1
Punitive Demolitions and Sealings
January 1981 - March 2003
Year

Demolished

Partially
Demolished

Sealed

Partially
sealed

Annual Total

1981

14

-

1

1

16

1982
1983

6
6

3
2

3
11

4
14

16
33

1984

3

-

1

3

7

1985

24

-

24

7

55

1986

12

1

10

25

48

1987

6

-

15

18

39

1988
1989
1990
1991

118
119
103
50

23
29
27
5

38
61
79
37

22
27
23
26

201
236
232
118

1992
1993

3
5

2

23
20

10
14

36
41

1994
1995

1
2

-

-

-

1

-

3

19968

11

1997
1998-2000

6
-

2001
2002
2003

8
190
73

-

3

Totals

760

94

328

1
-

-

-

-

11

2

-

8

-

-

-

-

9
190
76

194

1,376

1

8. Figures up to 1996 were obtained from AI-Haq's database. Figures from 1996
onwards are supplied by B'tselem, the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the
Occupied
Territories,
available
at
http://www.btselem.org/english/HouseDemolitions/Statistics.asp
(last visited April
2003).
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Domestic Legal Basis Relied Upon for Demolitions
Regulation 119(1) of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945

The demolition of the houses of those persons who have, or are
suspected to have been involved in acts prejudicial to the security of the
State of Israel is carried out pursuant to Regulation 119(l) of the Defence
(Emergency) Regulations, 1945. 9 This legislation was enacted by the
British government during the time of its mandate over Palestine and
pursuant to Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations'0 and Article 64 of
the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War." The Israeli authorities contend that these laws remain
"part and parcel" of the penal law in the Occupied Territories. 2 Falling
within a section of the Regulations entitled "Miscellaneous Penal
Provisions," Regulation 119(1) sets down, inter alia,that:
A Military Commander may by order direct the forfeiture to the
Government of Palestine of any house, structure, or land from which
he has reason to suspect that any firearm has been illegally
discharged, or any bomb, grenade or explosive or incendiary article
illegally thrown, detonated, exploded or otherwise discharged, or of
any house, structure or land situated in any area, town, village,
quarter or street the inhabitants or some of the inhabitants of which
he is satisfied have committed, or attempted to commit, or abetted the
commission of, or been accessories after the fact to the commission
of, any offence against these Regulations involving violence or
intimidation or any Military Court offence; and when any house,
structure or land is forfeited as aforesaid, the Military Commander
may destroy the house or the structure or anything in or on the house,
the structure or the land.
Israel's continued reliance on these Regulations generally, and on
Regulation 119(1) in particular, has been subject to heavy criticism on
several fronts.
Regarding the Defence (Emergency) Regulations themselves, it has
been pointed out that these were repealed by the British immediately
prior to the termination of their mandate by the Palestine (Revocations)
Order-in-Council of 1948.13 Thus, the Israeli authorities cannot rely

9. Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, [1945] Palestine Gazette (No. 1442),
Supp. No. 2, 1055.
10. Regulations annexed to Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land, signed at The Hague, Oct. 18, 1907 [hereinafter 1907 Hague Regulations].
11. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 1.
12. See Shamgar, supra note 1, at 275.
13. See COHEN, supra note 3, at 94-96; see also Martin B. Carroll, The Israeli
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thereupon, as the Regulations were not the "laws in force in the country,"
pursuant to Article 43, at the time the State of Israel came into existence.
The Israeli position is that the failure of the British Government to
publish the revocation order in the official Palestine Gazette prevented
the Regulations from being repealed. 14 Similarly, the implicit nature of a
revocation made by the Jordanian authorities in May 1948 is viewed by
Israel as also having failed to nullify those laws. Both the British and
Jordanian Governments have clearly and repeatedly stated that their view
is that these laws were repealed by them in 1948.15
Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention specifies that local law
may only remain in force provided that it is not "an obstacle to the
application to the Present Convention."' 16 The official commentary
elaborates that, "when the penal legislation of the occupied territory
conflicts with the provisions of the Convention, the Convention must
prevail.' 17 It is necessary, therefore, to establish whether the provisions
of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, specifically Regulation 119(1),
are compatible with the norms set down in the relevant treaties of
international humanitarian law.
B.

Regulation 119(1) andInternationalLaw

Regulation 119(1) allows for the seizure of any "house, structure, or
land" and for the subsequent destruction of "the house or the structure or
anything in or on the house, the structure or the land" as a punitive
measure for the commission of illegal acts. 18 Such punishment can be
imposed where any hostile activity has been carried out from within that
building itself or by inhabitants of other houses "in any area, town,
village, quarter or street."' 19 Therefore, a Military Commander may order
the demolition of a house, or houses, on the suspicion that some
inhabitants of a town have committed, or abetted the commission of, or

Demolition of Palestinian Houses in the Occupied Territories: An Analysis of its Legality
in International Law, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1195, 1202-1205 (1990).
14. See Na'azal v. IDF Commander in Judea and Samaria, 39(3) P.D. 645, 652
(1986) (summarized in English in 16 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 329 (1986)).
15.
See LYNN WELCHMAN, A THOUSAND AND ONE HOMES: ISRAEL'S DEMOLITION
AND SEALING OF HOUSES IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN 14-17 (1993); see also MARTHA
ROADSTRUM MOFFETT, PERPETUAL EMERGENCY: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF ISRAEL'S USE OF
THE BRITISH DEFENCE (EMERGENCY) REGULATIONS, 1945, IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

(1989).
16.

Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 1.

17.

COMMENTARY ON GENEVA CONVENTION IV OF 1949 RELATIVE TO THE
PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIMES OF WAR 336 (Jean Pictet ed., 1958)
[hereinafter COMMENTARY TO THE FOURTH GENEVA].

18.

Supra note 9.

19.

Id.
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been accessories to the commission of offences; the provision demands
no link between the perpetrators and those to be punished other than
mere geographical proximity.
Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention, to which Israel is a signatory and to which it is bound as an
Occupying Power, prohibits the destruction of property, "except where
such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military
operations." 20 Similarly, Article 23 of the 1907 Hague Regulations
stipulates that it is "especially forbidden" to "destroy or to seize the
enemy's property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively
demanded by the necessities of war." 21 By the very fact that housing
demolitions are carried out as a punitive measure would defeat any claim
that such actions can be justified as being an absolute military necessity.
The then Attorney General for Israel, Meir Shamgar, addressed the
issue of house demolitions as "personal punitive measures" in 197 1.22
He maintained that these demolitions could be based, "in appropriate
circumstances," on Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, citing
military requirements of two kinds. Firstly, there is the necessity of
destroying "the physical base for military action when persons in the
commission of a hostile military act are discovered., 23 Shamgar
contends that "[t]he house from which the hand grenades are thrown is 24a
military base, not different from a bunker in other parts of the world.,
Secondly, there is the need to deter future law-breaking, to "create
effective military reaction. 25 While there may be limited scope for the
destruction of a house during the course of military operations,
demolitions that are carried out punitively with the stated goal of
deterrence cannot be regarded as being imperative military necessities.
The fact that inhabitants are, on occasion, given advance warning that the
demolition is about to take place, allowing for their evacuation and the
retrieval of personal effects removes the immediacy that is demanded by
the military necessity requirement. Draper has concluded that
[t]o appeal to the humanitarian element by stating, which is true, that
the inhabitants are first removed before blowing up the house,
destroys the very basis of the26argument for the application of Article
53 under its exceptive clause.

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Supra note 1.
Supra note 10.
See Shamgar, supra note 1.
Id., at 276.
Id.

25. Id.
26. Colonel G.I.A.D. Draper, Military Necessity and HumanitarianImperatives, 12
REVUE DE DROIT PENAL MILITAIRE ET DE DROIT DE LA GUERRE 129, 140-141 (1973).
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Pursuant to Regulation 119(1) a Military Commander has complete
discretion in deciding to exercise this particular authority; there is no
provision made for any judicial process prior to the imposition of the
prescribed sanctions. Even more troubling is the fact that the suspicion
of the Military Commander that an offense has been committed is all that
is needed to trigger these extra-judicial sanctions. Under the laws of
occupation, an Occupying Power is not prevented from imposing
punishment on persons who have been found to have committed an
offense. However, international humanitarian law demands that a
suspect be afforded a judicial hearing prior to the imposition of any penal
sanction. The Fourth Geneva Convention establishes the due process
rights which must be observed by an Occupying Power. These include
the right to a regular trial;2 7 the right to be promptly informed of the
charges in writing; 28 the right to representation; 2 9 the right to present
evidence and to call witnesses; 30 and the right of appeal. 31 When the
power to demolish a house rests solely with an official of the executive,
with a limited right to have this decision reviewed (although not
provided for in Regulation 119(1)), there is a clear infringement of the
international legal rule that punitive measures cannot be imposed extrajudicially. The right to judicial review of demolition orders, which had
previously existed, was effectively removed by a recent decision of the
Supreme Court of Israel.32
In addition to being a violation of property rights and a form of
extra-judicial punishment, the demolition of Palestinian homes can also
be seen as a form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment. Such acts are prohibited by the Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 33 and,
also, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,34 both of
which Israel has ratified. Article 16 of the former treaty specifies that
States Parties to the convention "shall undertake to prevent in any
territory under its jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture as defined in
article I, when such acts are committed by or at the instigation of or with
the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note I, Article 71.
Id.
Id., Article 72.
Id.
Id., Article 73.
See detailed discussion in Section IV, below.
G.A. res. 39/46, annex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 97, U.N. Doc. A/39/51

(1984), Article 16.

34.

G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1976), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, Article 7.
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an official capacity.
The hardship and suffering that is caused by punitive house
demolitions is indeed palpable. The loss of one's home and belongings
undoubtedly causes severe mental anguish for the former inhabitants, in
addition to rendering them physically homeless. Rather than seeking to
prevent this form of cruel and inhuman treatment, Israel had adopted the
practice of punitive house demolitions as an official State policy.
Recently, the United Nations Committee against Torture addressed
Israel's continued practice of house demolitions. This body found that
these demolitions, in certain circumstances, may amount to instances of
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in violation of
Article 16 of the Convention.36 The Committee called upon Israel to
"desist from the policies of closure and house demolition where they
offend article 16 of the Convention". 37 As the punitive house demolition
policy has been applied exclusively against Palestinians it may also be
possible to argue that this policy is discriminatory.3 8
One of the most serious indictments that can be made of this policy,
and the primary focus of this article, is that punitive house demolitions
punish persons for offenses committed by others. When a house is
demolished for the illegal activities of one of the inhabitants, all the other
inhabitants suffer the effects of those actions that have been taken.
Punitive house demolitions bear all the hallmarks of acts of collective
punishment.
III.

The Prohibition of Collective Punishment Under International Law

It is a fundamental legal principle that individuals may only be
punished for offenses which they have personally committed. The
corollary to this is that persons or groups of persons may not be punished
for acts which have been committed by others. Punishment must be
personal and individual. International law proscribes punishing persons
on a collective or non-individual basis. Within both international human

35.

Article 1 defines torture as:
...any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is

intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as... punishing him for an
act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other
person acting in an official capacity.
36. Concluding observations on Third Periodic Report submitted by Israel,
CAT/C/XVII/Concl.5 of Nov. 23, 2001, para. 6 (j).
37. Id., para. 7 (g).

38. There are no recorded instances of the demolition of houses as punishment for
crimes committed by Israeli citizens.
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rights law and international humanitarian law the individual nature of
punishment has been constantly stressed'
A.

InternationalHuman Rights Law

Under the international human rights law regime the prohibition of
non-individual punishment is generally found within the sphere of due
process guarantees. Article 5(3) of the American Convention on Human
Rights sets out that "[p]unishment shall not be extended to any person
other than the criminal., 39 The African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights also affirms, in Article 7, that "[p]unishment is personal and can
be imposed only on the offender. 4 0 Subjecting persons not convicted of
any offense to collective (or any) punishment may also conflict with the
right to be given a fair trial 4' and contravenes the presumption of
innocence.4 2
B. InternationalHumanitarianLaw
International humanitarian law lays down a similar, but decidedly
more comprehensive prohibition on the use of collective punishment. A
number of this legal regime's principal instruments expressly proscribe
any measures that would punish persons for offenses which they did not
personally commit. Article 87 of the Third Geneva Convention, which
protects prisoners of war, prohibits "[c]ollective punishment for
individual acts. 4 3 The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions,
adopted in 1977, contain a common provision which sets out that "no
one shall be convicted of an offence except on the basis of individual
penal responsibility. '"44 Both Additional Protocols also specifically
39. American Convention on Human Rights, (1978), 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
40. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, (1986), O.A.U. Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5
41. Guaranteed by Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A.
Res. 217A (111), U.N. Doc. A/810 at 171 (1948); Article 14(1) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Article 8(1) of the American Convention; Article
6(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, (1953) 213 U.N.T.S 221, E.T.S. 005; and Article 7(1) of the African Charter.
42. Guaranteed by Article 11 of the Universal Declaration; Article 14(2) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Article 8(2) of the American
Convention; Article 6(2) of the European Convention; and Article 7(l)(b) of the African
Charter.
43. Geneva Convention Ill Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention].
44. Article 75(4)(b) of Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Victims of International Armed Conflict, June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3-608 [hereinafter Additional Protocol 1] and Article 6(2)(b) of Protocol 11
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection
of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8,1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144
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prohibit the imposition of collective punishments "at any time and in any
place whatsoever. 4 5 Article 4(b) of the Statute of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda expressly enumerates collective
punishment as a crime for which persons may be prosecuted by the
Tribunal.46 However, it is in the two treaties which guarantee the
protection of civilians in occupied territory, the 1907 Hague Convention
and the Fourth Geneva Convention, that humanitarian law offers the
most substantial and detailed prohibition on the imposition of collective
punishments.
Article 50 of the 1907 Hague Regulations establishes that:
No general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be inflicted upon
the population on account of the acts of individuals 4for
7 which they
cannot be regarded as jointly and severally responsible.
Article 33(1) of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides a more
concrete and absolute prohibition of collective punishment by
emphasizing the principle of individual responsibility:
No protected person may be punished for an offence he or she has not
personally committed. Collective penalties and
48 likewise all measures
of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited.
Article 50 demands a very high degree of responsibility, that of
being "jointly and severally responsible" before punishment may be
imposed, and it does offer a considerably high degree of protection from
collective punishment [emphasis added].
Article 33(1) of the Fourth Geneva Convention is derived from
Article 50 of the Hague Regulations but provides a much clearer and
unambiguous prohibition of collective punishment than its predecessor.
It sets down that "no protected person may be punished for an offence he
or she has not personally committed." This provision re-affirms the
individual nature of punishment, that "[r]esponsibility is personal and
[that] it will no longer be possible to inflict penalties on persons who
have themselves not committed the acts complained of. '49 In the
Commentary to the Fourth Geneva Convention, Pictet points out that the
Annex 11, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol 11].
45. Article 75(2)(d) of Additional Protocol I and Article 4(2)(b) of Additional
Protocol I1.
46. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda, (1994) U.N. Doc. S/Res/955.
47. Supra note 10.
48. Supra note I.
49. COMMENTARY TO THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 17, at 225.
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prohibition of collective punishment in Article 33(1) "does not refer to
punishments inflicted under penal law, i.e. sentences pronounced by a
court after due process of law, but penalties of any kind inflicted on
persons or entire groups of persons. 50 The scope of the prohibition is
thus quite broad, encompassing "penalties of any kind" whether inflicted
by a court or by any executive organ of government. The official
Commentary to the Additional Protocols similarly advocates that "[t]he
concept of collective punishment ...should be understood in the widest
sense, and concerns not only penalties imposed in the normal judicial
process, but also any other kind of sanction. 51 It is clear, therefore, that
persons must be personallyresponsible for the commission of an offense
before any punishment may be meted out upon them for that crime.
The second sentence of Article 33(1) sets out that "[c]ollective
penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are
prohibited." This prohibition on the use of collective penalties is a
simple restatement of the rule set down in the preceding sentence.
Laying a prohibition on measures of intimidation or terrorism of
protected persons was deemed necessary because of the earlier practice
by belligerents of "resorting to intimidatory measures to terrorise the
population... [in order] to prevent hostile acts., 52 Such collective
measures "strike at innocent and guilty alike ...[and] are opposed to all
principles based on humanity and justice., 53
Highlighting the
propinquity of collective punishments and measures of intimidation or
terrorism is quite apt: frequently a measure that is claimed to be
legitimately punitive in nature may often be imposed solely to subjugate
a particular group.
C. Customary Status of the Prohibition
Whilst there are various conventional prohibitions against acts of
collective punishment, as have been outlined, conventional law only
binds parties who have ratified those instruments in which these articles
are found, except where those particular provisions are deemed to be
declaratory of customary international law. It is necessary, therefore, to
establish the customary status of those norms set down in treaty law.
The Statute of the International Court of Justice, in Article 38,
paragraph 1(b), describes international custom "as evidence of a general

50.

Id.

51.
COMMENTARY TO THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 1374 (Claude Pilloud et al. eds, 1987) [hereinafter
COMMENTARY TO THE ADDITIONAL].
52.
COMMENTARY TO THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 17, at 226.

53.

Id.
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practice accepted as law.", 54 Thus, it is State practice and the
accompanying opinio juris which are the necessary ingredients for the
creation of custom. The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia
acknowledged in the infamous Prosecutorv. Tadic case the problematic
nature of accurately assessing State practice during conflict situations:
When attempting to ascertain State practice with a view to
establishing the existence of a customary rule or general principle, it
is difficult, if not impossible, to pinpoint the actual behaviour of the
troops in the field for the purpose of establishing whether they in fact
comply with, or disregard certain standards of behaviour. This
examination is rendered extremely difficult by the fact that not only
is access to the theatre of military operations normally refused to
independent observers (often even to the ICRC) but information on
the actual conduct of hostilities is withheld by the parties to the
conflict; what is worse, often recourse is had to misinformation with
a view to misleading
the enemy as well as public opinion and foreign
55
Governments.

In assessing the customary status of the prohibition of collective
punishment it is useful to consider - where State practice is not readily
discernible - the level of ratification of the treaties containing those rules
and also the approach that has been taken to the issue by international
organizations and judicial bodies.
The 1907 Hague Convention and its annexed regulations are
unanimously viewed as being declaratory of customary international
law.56 The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg held that the
rules laid down in this convention were, by 1939, declaratory of the laws
and customs of war.57 Therefore, it can be said that Article 50 of the
Hague Regulations, outlawing the imposition of penalties on persons
who cannot be regarded as "jointly and severally responsible" for the
acts of complained of, is a binding rule of customary international law.
The Fourth Geneva Convention is a much more expansive treaty
and, as such, not all of its provisions may be customary norms of
international law. However, many of the articles in this treaty are restatements or developments of earlier treaty rules and as such may be
customary rules; Article 33(1) of the Fourth Geneva Convention is based
on Article 50 of the Hague regulations and, thus, its broader protection
54. June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, entered intoforce Oct. 24, 1945.
55. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR2, Appeals Chamber, Oct. 2, 1995,
para. 99.
56. See DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 68 (Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff

eds., 3d ed. 2000).
57. International Military Tribunal, Judgement 83, 1947, Nazi Conspiracy and
Aggression: Opinion andJudgment, 1947.
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against collective punishment is, in part, based on established custom.
Can it be said that this provision's establishment of the individual nature
of punishment in 1949 has, since then, crystallized into a norm of
customary international law? To determine so, it is necessary to look at a
number of factors.
As one commentator has noted, "the larger the conventional
community, the more the treaty approximates the status of general
international law." 58 In this regard it is worth noting that there has been
near-universal ratification of the Fourth Geneva Convention and, in fact,
there are presently almost as many States parties to the Fourth Geneva
Convention as there are to the Charter of the United Nations.5 9 No party
to the Fourth Geneva Convention has entered any reservation or
declaration toward Article 33(1) and it is extremely doubtful that any
party would claim a right to impose punishment on persons who have not
committed any offences. Protected persons, those who find themselves
"in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which
they are not nationals,, 60 cannot be subjected to collective punishment as
a matter of treaty law and, it would also seem, as a matter of customary
law.
The customary status of the prohibition of collective punishment in
the Fourth Geneva Convention is strengthened by the presence of like
provisions in the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions.
At the time of writing, Additional Protocol I has been ratified by 160
States parties, while there are 172 States parties to Additional Protocol II
applicable in non-international armed conflicts. 6' Theodor Meron has
recommended that for any particular treaty these "ratifications should be
evaluated from the perspective of the relevance and weight of the
ratifying states., 62 In this respect, it must be noted that four of the five
permanent members of the United Nations Security Council have ratified
or acceded to both Additional Protocols: China, the Russian Federation,
the United Kingdom, and most recently, France. Seventeen of the
nineteen members of NATO have also become parties to these

58.

Georges Abi-Saab, The 1977 Additional Protocols and General International

Law: Some Preliminary Reflections, in HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT:
CHALLENGES AHEAD, ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF FRITS KALSHOVEN 115, 117 (A. Delissen and

G.Tanja eds., 1991).
59. At the time of writing there are 191 States parties to the Charter of the United
Nations, see http://www.un.org/Overview/growth.htm and 189 States parties to the
Fourth Geneva Convention, see http://www.icrc.org/ihl (both sites last visited April
2003).
60. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 1,Article 4.
61. See http://www.icrc.org/ihl.
62.

THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY

LAW 74 (1989).
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protocols. 63 A perusal of the reservations made by States who have
ratified the instrument will show no hostility on their parts to the
outlawing of collective punishment by Additional Protocols I and II.
Having delineated the nature of the prohibition of collective
punishment under international law it is necessary to set out a number of
specific requirements which must be satisfied before a measure may be
classified as one of collective punishment. Firstly, there must be a
tangible connection between the offenses which have been committed
and the punishment imposed, that is, the punitive measures have been
imposed in direct response to the conmmission of illegal acts. Secondly,
the hardship endured by innocent parties must be substantial and not
merely incidental to the suffering of those persons guilty of the offense.
For example, lawful imprisonment often causes hardship for an
offender's relatives but such a sanction could never be considered to be
one of collective punishment. By setting down these necessary elements
it is not intended to adopt an overly strict interpretation of collective
punishment, in defiance of the official view that the term be "understood
in the broadest sense;" 64 instead, it is done so that incidents of collective
punishment may be clearly differentiated from other, possibly unlawful,
acts. Such clarity is of absolute necessity because the commission of any
act of collective punishment would be considered as being "in defiance
of the most elementary principles of humanity.' 65
IV. House Demolitions and the Supreme Court of Israel
The preceding section has established that various treaties of
international humanitarian law and international human rights law
prohibit the imposition of collective punishment. The prohibition of
such acts during periods of military occupation may be considered a
norm of customary international law. Protected persons, those who find
themselves in the hands of an Occupying Power of which they are not
nationals, may never be punished for an offence which they have not
personally committed. Israel's relationship vis-6-vis the West Bank and
Gaza is clearly that of an Occupying power; as a signatory to the Fourth
Geneva Convention and owing to the customary status of this
prohibition, Israel is legally bound to respect the prohibition against
collective punishments. The punitive house demolition policy that has
been employed throughout the past four decades of this occupation casts
63. A number of major military powers, specifically the United States, Iran, Iraq,
India, Pakistan, Israel and Turkey, have not ratified the protocols. For the United States
position, see generally Abraham D. Sofaer The Rationalefor the United States Decision,
82 AM. J. INT'L. L. 784 (1988).
64. COMMENTARY TO THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 51, at 874.
65. COMMENTARY TO THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 17, at 225.
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serious doubt over the Israeli authorities commitment to the observance
of this important rule of international humanitarian law.
Regulation 119(1) of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945,
allows for the demolition of houses as a punitive measure.66 This
legislation does not, however, compel a Military Commander to employ
this sanction in response to the commission of illegal acts. Despite the
fact that the Israeli authorities' use of these Regulations is questionable,
they continue to take measures pursuant thereto. It is clear, therefore,
that a Military Commander is not prevented from employing alternative
means of punishment as prescribed for by these Regulations, such as
imprisonment, 67 imposing a monetary fine, 68 or detention pursuant to

Regulation 111. Nevertheless, Commanders of the Israeli forces in the
West Bank and Gaza have repeatedly resorted to the power granted to
them by Regulation 119(1) to demolish or seal houses as a punitive
measure.
On many occasions the Supreme Court of Israel, sitting as the High
Court of Justice, has been petitioned by or on behalf of Palestinians
whose homes are due to be demolished by the army. The case law
demonstrates that the Court has refrained from addressing the legality of
the demolitions themselves and has, instead, confined itself to examining
whether the Military Commander has exercised his powers in accordance
with Regulation 119(1). It has frequently been argued that punitive
house demolitions are measures of collective punishment in violation of
Article 50 of the 1907 Hague Regulations and Article 33(1) of the Fourth
Geneva Convention. The Supreme Court accepts that that the 1907
Hague Regulations, because of their customary status, are binding law in
Israel and the Occupied Territories. 69 Despite the fact that Israel is a
signatory to the Fourth Geneva Convention the Israeli authorities have
refused to accept the de jure applicability of this treaty, although the
court agrees that it is bound by those provisions of the convention which
have been transformed into rules of customary international law. y°
While acknowledging that innocent persons are adversely affected
by demolitions, the Supreme Court has consistently failed to view
demolitions as acts of collective punishment. The issue was raised
before the Court in Daghlas et al v. Military Commander of the Judea
and Samaria Region. Justice Ben-Dror delivered the Court's response
66.
67.

Supra note 9.
Id., Regulation 53.

68. Id., Regulation 56(B).
69. See COHEN, supra note 3, at 43.
70. See EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL
(1993).
71.

HCJ No. 698/85, 40(2) P.D. 42.

LAW OF OCCUPATION

109-111, 118
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to the petitioners' claim that house demolitions constituted acts of
collective punishment:
.there is no basis to the petitioner's complaint that house
demolition is a form of collective punishment. In their opinion, only
the terrorists and criminals themselves should be punished, and house
demolition punishes additional family members who will be left
without shelter. Such an interpretation, if accepted by us, would
leave the above Regulation and its orders void of content,
leaving
72
only the possibility of punishing a terrorist who lives alone.
The petitioners' argument was rejected by the court, not on the
grounds that demolitions do not amount to collective punishment but
because if they were to be seen as such this particular law would be made
redundant.
Outlining that the 'underlying legislative policy' of
Regulation 119 is "to achieve a deterring effect," Judge Ben-Dror
continues by stating that.
[The terrorist] should know that his criminal acts will not only hurt
him, but are apt to cause great suffering to his family. From this
point of view, the above sanction of house demolition is no different
than the punishment of imprisonment imposed on the head of a
family, a father whose small children will be without a supporter and
a bread winner. Here too, members of the family are affected .... the
petitioner must take this into account before committing his crime
and know that others of his family will be forced to suffer the
consequences of his deeds. In the case before it is clear that the
terrorists came from certain homes, and these homes - and no others
- are about to be demolished. In any case the "punishment" has not
been imposed on the homes of uninvolved persons, and it is difficult
to understand the origins of the
73 claim that we are here dealing with a
case of collective punishment.
The Court recognizes here that demolitions will cause 'great
suffering' for innocent family members, that they are 'forced to suffer'
for the offender's individual acts, yet do not subscribe to the argument
that this amounts to an act of collective punishment.
Further, the Court lays the illogical claim that house demolitions, as
a form of punishment, are no different from imprisonment. The flaws of
this comparison are obvious; where a house is demolished all the
inhabitants suffer the same fate, whereas when a person is imprisoned, it
is only that person that is punished; any negative effects felt by others are
merely incidental to the offender's punishment. In the case in hand, the

72.
73.

Id., para. 3.
Id.
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first petitioner's brother, who had committed one of the offense's in
question, had already been detained. David Kretzmer would contend that
in such a scenario, "the immediate aim of demolishing the house is not to
deny rights or freedoms of that person but to cause suffering to his
family., 74 Addressing the Court's justification that demolitions serve a
deterrent purpose, Kretzmer concludes that demolition of a house "could
conceivably be effective as a general deterrent (though of course, it may
also be counter-productive), but the objection to collective punishment is
not that it is not an effective deterrent, but that it is cruel and inhuman. 75
Justice Ben-Dror's concluding comments on the issue of collective
punishment are equally implausible. He asserts that because it is only
the offender's home that is demolished, and that the homes of
"uninvolved persons" are spared, there can be no claim of collective
punishment. No account is taken of the "uninvolved persons" in the
house of the offender; the mother of the first petitioner, the second
petitioner's two daughters and her son who had been studying in India
and the two sons of the fifth petitioner who had been in West Germany at
the time.76 This approach displays a wholesale failure on the part of the
Court to acknowledge that housing demolitions impose punishment on
the innocent inhabitants of the offender's house.
Although counsel for the petitioners did not specifically raise the
argument of collective punishment in a subsequent case, Nasman et al v.
Commander of the IDF Forces in Gaza Strip,77 Justice Or acknowledged
the suffering of innocent parties:
One must remember that we are talking about the destruction and
sealing up of a structure in which other people
live, an act as result of
78
which innocent people shall also be hurt.
The Court refused, however, to find demolitions illegal on such
grounds and affirmed that they "shall not intervene in the decision of a
military commander under Regulation 119 of the Defence Regulations
(emergency), 1945, when this decision stands the test of
reasonableness." 79 This assessment, of whether "the respondent, in
considering and making his decision, acted properly and reasonably,
taking into account the genuine facts of the case,"80 takes no account
whatsoever of the collective nature of the penal sanction prescribed by

74.

DAVID KRETZMER, THE OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE 150 (2002).

75.
76.

Id.
See Petition to the Court, on file at AI-Haq's library.

77.

HCJ No. 802/89, on file at AI-Haq's library.

78. Id., para. 4.
79. Id.
80.

Para. 3.
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Regulation 119(1). This approach has been adopted by the Court in all
of its dealings with the issue of punitive house demolitions.
In Hizran et al v. The Commander of the IDF in Judea and
8 1 the hardship imposed on innocent parties was again
Samaria,
acknowledged by the Court and it was once again justified as a necessity
for achieving effective deterrence. Judge Netanyahu spoke of the
'extensive' authority that is given to a military commander by Regulation
119(1). This authority, he stated,
... is not restricted to the living unit of the perpetrator himself. It
extends beyond this, to the entire structure (and even the land) the
residents of which, or some of the residents of which have committed
an offence. .. I am not overlooking the fact that destroying the
structures in their entirety shall hurt not only the petitioners
themselves but also their families. However this is a result of the
necessity of deterring the public so that they may see and learn that
by their criminal acts, they not only harm individuals, endanger
public safety and incur severe punishment on themselves,
but also
82
bring hardship to the members of their households.
Justice Bach, in Alamarin v. Commander of the IDF Forces in the Gaza
Strip,83 recognized both the extra-judicial nature of the punishment and the
fact that is undeniably collective in nature and in effect:
... it clearly follows that the commander's authority also applies to
those parts of an apartment or house which are owned or used by the
family of the suspect or others, who have not been proved to have
taken part in,
encouraged or even been aware of the criminal act of
84
the suspect.
In both of these cases the Court rejected the petitions and upheld the

orders for the destruction of the buildings in question. It is of particular
interest to note that Justice Cheshin delivered a strong dissenting opinion
in both of these cases, voicing his concern at the collective nature of the
sanction of house demolitions.
Judge Cheshin began his discussion of this issue in the Hizran case
by establishing that "the guiding principle" is that "one must not impose
collective punishment or collective sanctions," 85 that "each of the
86
petitioners, and himself alone, should be punished for his crime.
81. HCJ No. 4772/5359/91, on file at AI-Haq's library.
82. Id., para. 5.
83. RCJ No. 2722/92, on file at AI-Haq's library.
84. Para. 6.
85.

Supra note 81, para. 13.

86.

Id., para. 14.
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However, in his final analysis he interpreted the prohibition on collective
punishment as preventing the punishment of persons residing in separate
living units of the building to be demolished; he refused to accept that
the hardship imposed on persons who shared such a living unit with the
offender is clearly also an act of collective punishment. In a later
decision, however, he held that only the room in which the person who
committed the offences lived, should be affected by the order. 87 While
his assertions are a step in the right direction, his opinions have failed to
persuade other members of the Court to realize the collective nature of
the sanction which they continuously legitimize.
In recent years the Israeli authorities have adopted a policy of
demolishing the houses of families of suicide bombers. In Sabeach v.
IDF Commander in Judea andSamaria,88 the family argued that only the
room in which the offender had stayed should be sealed. The court
disagreed, reasoning that "for a terrorist who is planning to blow himself
up and commit suicide the fear that the army could afterwards only seal
his private room, or even demolish it, would serve no deterrent purpose.
In such a situation the respondent's [house demolition] order would lose
all it's meaning", 8 9 In Nazaal v. IDFCommander in Judea and Samaria,
the argument that demolition amounted collective punishment was again
raised but the Court opined that:
The object of using the powers granted to the military commander,
according to Regulation 119(1)... is to deter potential terrorists from
carrying out their murderous acts, as an essential measure for
maintaining security. . . . Imposition of the said sanction does indeed
have a severe punitive effect, which harms not only the terrorist, but
also others, generally members of his family who live90with him, but
this is not its aim and this is not what is intended to do.
Once again the Court recognizes the direct hardship imposed on
innocent family members, but holds that it was justified as a deterrent
and because such an effect was not the aim of the measure.
The jurisprudence is clear - the Supreme Court has consistently
refused to recognize punitive house demolitions as an act of collective
punishment, but rather a sanction necessary for deterrence. This
approach fails to take account of the fact that all punitive measures are
implicitly deterrent in nature. David Kretzmer has recently assessed the
Court's approach to this issue and drew this harsh conclusion;

87.
88.
89.
90.

Nazaal v. IDF Commander in Judea and Samaria, (1994) 48 (5) P.D. 338.
(1996), 50 (1) P.D. 353; cited in KRETZMER, supra note 74, at 151.
Id., at 363.
See Nazaal, supra note 87, at 346.
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It would seem that the Court's decisions on house demolitions typify
its jurisprudence on the Occupied Territories. The Court has not seen
itself as a body that should question the legality under international
law of policies or actions of the authorities, or should interpret the
law in a rights-minded fashion. On the contrary it has accepted and
legitimised policies and actions the legality of which is 91
highly
dubious and has interpreted the law in favour of the authorities.
This is a serious indictment of the highest judicial authority in the
State of Israel. The Court's persistent legitimization of the authorities'
punitive house demolition policy, and the associated failure to recognize
and condemn the actions taken thereunder as illegal acts of collective
punishment, cast serious doubt on the fairness and independence of that
body.
A.

Removal of the right to be heard before demolition

In August 2002, the Supreme Court of Israel delivered a judgment
relating to Israel's punitive house demolition policy which was a further
assault on the already battered rule of law in the Occupied Territories.
The decision in the case of Amar et al v. IDF Commander of the West
Bank92 effectively removed the right to judicial review of house
demolition orders issued by the occupying army. This case involved ten
petitions which were taken by family members of persons who had
committed attacks against Israelis and who feared that their houses were
going to be demolished by the respondent. The petitioners sought a
guarantee from the Court that the respondent would give sufficient time
prior to demolition to allow them to petition the Court and seek a
decision as to whether the Military Commander had the competence in
the particular circumstances to issue a demolition order. 93 The Court
made it clear that a Military Commander has the right to demolish houses
pursuant to Regulation 119(1) of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations,
1945, and that this was not being contested by the petitioners, whose sole
concern was obtaining a guarantee of the right to be heard.94
Up to this point the right to be heard had been enforced quite
rigorously by the Court. In 1989, the Court held that occupants must be
given a hearing prior to demolition and sufficient time to petition the
Court if the outcome of the hearing is unfavorable. 95 The argument put
forward by the respondent in Association for Civil Rights in Israel v.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

See KRETZMER, supra note 74, at 163.
HCJ No. 6696/02, on file at AI-Haq's library [unofficial translation].
Jd., para. 1.
Id., para. 2.
43 (2) Piskei Din 529 [English summary: 23 ISR. Y.B. HuM. RTS. 294 (1993)].
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Officer Commanding Central Command, that in certain "severe and
exceptional circumstances" a hearing could be denied, was rejected by
the Court. In such instances, the Court held, the house could be sealed
instead of demolished outright and a hearing could then be held to
establish if actual demolition may be carried out. 96 Although the
Supreme Court had failed to recognize the illegality of house
demolitions, it had allowed for sufficient time prior to demolition for
families to challenge a Military Commander's decision to demolish.
In Amar et al the respondent argued against allowing inhabitants the
right to be heard in all circumstances:
The giving of a warning such as this, on an operational action
expected in enemy territory, is liable to endanger in a very real way
the lives of our forces, and even endanger the success of the action,
as notice will enable the enemy to booby trap the aforementioned
houses, to set an ambush for the forces which are to arrive there, and
so on. Phenomena such as these have occurred in the past months in
various places throughout the territories. For these reasons, as a rule,
no military force, employing military-war actions in enemy territory,
gives prior warning for operational activity it intends to implement,
warning which could put in very real danger the lives of its soldiers
and endanger the success of the operation.
President Barak's analysis began from a similar "state of war"
premise: "Israel is in the midst of combat activity" and its "army is
conducting various combat actions, the goal of which is to return security
to the region and the State". 98 He affirmed that the need to undertake
"deterrent activities," such as house demolitions, is at the discretion of
the army as part of "overall combat activity." 99
The Court recognized the existence of a fundamental right to be
heard, a right which is "applicable in the matter of the destruction of
structures in which terrorists live, both in periods of calm and periods of
combat activities."' 0 0 Such a right is not, however, an absolute right. It
is not applicable in "special or exceptional circumstances," one of which
is where there is a risk of injury to body or property "during an
operational-military action within the framework of combat activity of
96.

The Court did allow for dispensation of the hearing requirement in the case of

99.

Id.

"operational-military circumstances in which judicial review is incompatible with
conditions of place and time or the nature of the circumstances." Id., at 540-541. Rather
than referring to punitive demolitions, the exception mentioned is that already enshrined
in Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention which allows for property destruction as
an absolute military necessity [emphasis added].
97. See Amar et al., supra note 92, para. 2.
98. Id., para. 3.
100.

Id., para. 4.
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the army." 10 President Barak then referred to Association for Civil
Rights in Israel v. Officer Commanding Central Command where it was
held that the right to be heard could be dispensed with during "militaryoperational circumstances," in which the army might need, for example,
"be rid of a barrier or overcome resistance or respond to attacks on the
army forces."' 1 2 He cited another case in which a similar rule was
upheld in instances of "destruction of structures as part of militaryoperational activities.' 0 3 He then drew the conclusion that:
In this matter there is no distinction if the damage to property is a
side effect of the military action, or if the damage to property is the
fundamental target which guided the military action. These are according to our assumptions - operation activities meant to
safeguard
the region and the state, which the respondent is authorised
04
to do. 1

It must be noted that the exceptions in the earlier cases referred to
property destruction in the course of military operations, whereas in the
case in hand the demolitions are wholly punitive in nature.
President Barak continued:
The right to the right of hearing in the case of a military-operational
action is derived from a balance between the right of the individual to
be heard in the face of damage to his person or property and the
necessary public need in fulfilling the military action - a need behind
which stands, amongst other things, the concern for the security of
the soldiers and their lives. . . . if there is a serious fear that awarding
the right of hearing will endanger the lives of soldiers and endanger
the action itself, the right
of hearing is cancelled in the face of
05
essential combat needs.'
Where such a danger doesn't exist, the right to a hearing must be
upheld. Barak asserted that even in circumstances where the right will
not be upheld "in its entirety," it must be upheld "partially," such as
allowing a hearing before the military commander "on the spot before
the property is damaged."'' 0 6 He found that it could never be determined
in advance whether circumstances would allow for the granting of a
hearing, that "[e]verything is dependent on the circumstances of the
101.
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106.

Id.
Id.
HCJ No. 4112/90, Associationfor Civil Rights in Israel v. Southern Commander,
See Amar et al, supra note 92, para. 4.
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matter, and on the correct balance between the right of hearing and the
danger (to soldiers) and the chance (of fulfilling the action)." 10 7 Finding
this petition too general, the Court decided that it could not grant a right
to judicial review in all circumstances. The Court concluded that the
responsibility for detennining whether to grant a hearing prior to
demolition rests with the IDF Commander. Hence, the petitions were
rejected.
The decision reached by the Supreme Court in this case continues in
their approach of giving a margin of discretion to the IDF for their
actions in the Occupied Territories. At the outset, punitive house
demolitions, those which do not take place during combat activity but,
rather, in the aftermath of the commission of illegal activities, are
described by the Court as actions of a military character. The Court then
asserts that during such operations it is the military commander who is
best placed to decide on whether to delay a demolition and allow a
hearing. In effect, the Court absolves itself of having to deal with
decisions taken by the army in the Occupied Territories. Military
commanders are thus given complete discretion; not only as to whether
to demolish a house punitively, but also as to whether they should allow
their order of demolition to be challenged before a judicial body. The
Court again upholds the extra-judicial nature of the punishment and has
removed the one semblance of adherence to the rule of law that had
previously been present: the right to judicial review of house demolition
orders.
The following day nine separate petitions were submitted to the
Court on the issue of punitive house demolitions. 10 8 In response to all
nine petitions, the Court delivered one, extremely brief, judgment. The
Court held that:
... [persons] who fear that their homes will be damaged due to
actions of their family members as terrorists who caused injury to
human life, can at their own initiative turn to the respondent. They
will pass to the respondent data which in the opinion of the family
members could influence his decision. As much as possible a plan of
the house will also be given, and a map indicating its location. In
initiated actions planned enough ahead of time, the respondent will
not carry out the demolition actions prior to weighing this
information. This proposal is acceptable to the respondent. In our
opinion, with this the principle practical problem is solved.
Once again, the Court relinquishes full discretion for carrying out
demolitions to the military commander; he is under no obligation to reply
107.
108.

ld., para. 6.
HCJ No. 6868/02, on file at AI-Haq's library.
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to the petitioners and it is highly unlikely that a mere letter will alter his
decision to demolish. The "principle practical problem" is far from
solved by this decision.
V.

Serious Violations of International Law

A.

Grave Breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention

The Fourth Geneva Convention, in Article 147, sets out a number of
the most serious violations of international humanitarian law. These
violations are referred to as "grave breaches" of the convention:
Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those
involving any of the following acts, if committed against persons or
property protected by the present Convention: wilful killing, torture
or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully
causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, unlawful
deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person,
compelling a protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile
Power, or wilfully depriving a protected person of the rights of fair
and regular trial prescribed in the present Convention, taking of
hostages and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not
military necessity and carried out unlawfully and
justified by
09
wantonly.
Pursuant to Article 146 of the Fourth Geneva
Contracting Parties to that treaty are obliged to act
commission of grave breaches by either their own
citizens of another State's party to the convention.
inter alia, that:

Convention, High
in the face of the
citizens or by the
This article states,

Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search
for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be
committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons,
regardless of their nationality, before its own courts.
Persons who commit, or order the commission of, grave breaches
must be held individually responsible for their criminal acts. It has been
shown that Israel's punitive house demolition policy is in violation of
international humanitarian law; has this violative action reached the level
of a grave breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention?
Israel's house demolition policy throughout the occupation would

109.
110.

Supra note 1.
Id.
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seem to fit the grave breach of "extensive destruction and appropriation
of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully
and wantonly," set out in Article 147. The demolition of houses has
undoubtedly been carried out extensively and, as it has been shown
above, any measure that is expressly punitive in nature cannot be
justified as an absolute military necessity.
That punitive house
demolitions are unlawful under international law has also been clearly
established. Destruction that is carried out wantonly refers to destruction
that is "extensive, unnecessary and willful.""' Thousands of Palestinian
homes have deliberately been demolished or sealed as a punitive
measure. Ostensibly these demolitions have been carried out as a
deterrent against future illegal activities. Apart from the issue of the
legality of the actions, the strategy behind the use of the house
demolition policy must also be questioned. Despite the widespread use
of house demolitions as a deterrent measure, Palestinians have continued
to mount armed attacks against Israeli citizens and members of the
occupying army. Israel's pursuit of its punitive house demolition policy
has led to extensive destruction of property, not justified by military
necessity and which has been carried out unlawfully and wantonly.
Israel's punitive house demolition policy amounts to a grave breach
of the Fourth Geneva Convention, to which Israel is a signatory and to
which it is bound as an occupying power. 1 2 The international
community - the majority of States are High Contracting Parties to the
Fourth Geneva Convention - has a clear duty to investigate, prosecute,
and punish those members of the IDF who have committed or ordered
the commission of punitive house demolitions.
B.

Extensive PropertyDestruction as a War Crime

On occasion, it has been contended that the demolition of houses in
the Occupied Territories is lawful under the laws of occupation, as these
have been carried out on the basis of military necessity. The Attorney
General for Israel put forward this argument in 1971.113 It has already
been shown that punitive measures cannot satisfy the military necessity
111.Jeremy Bowen, Wanton Destruction, in CRIMES OF WAR: WHAT THE PUBLIC
SHOULD KNOW 372 (Roy Gutman and David Rieffeds., 1999).
112. See WELCHMAN, supra note 15, at 45; see also JOHN QUIGLEY, THE LEGAL
CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEMOLITION OF HOUSES BY ISRAEL IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA

STRIP 13 (1994).
113. See Shamgar, supra note 1, at 276. See also Emanuel Gross, Democracy's
Struggle Against Terrorism. The Powers of Military Commanders to Decide Upon the
Demolition of Houses, the Imposition of Curfews, Blockades, Encirclements and the
Declarationof an Area as a Closed Military Area, 30 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 165, 198-

212 (2002).
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requirement under international humanitarian law for property
destruction. Can it be concluded that under international criminal law
house demolitions amount to the war crime of extensive property
destruction not justified by military necessity?
Article 6(c) of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg enumerated the "wanton destruction of cities, towns or
villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity" as a war
crime." 4
The recently entered-into-force Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court expressly holds grave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions to be war crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court.115 Article 8(2)(a)(iv) stipulates that the grave breach of "extensive
destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly" isa war crime. The
Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has also
enumerated the grave breach of extensive property destruction as a war
crime. 1 6 The elements of the war crime of extensive property
destruction in the Rome Statute have been set out as follows:
1.The perpetrator destroyed or appropriated certain property
2. The destruction or appropriation was not justified by military
necessity.
3. The destruction or appropriation was extensive and carried out
wantonly

114. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, and Establishing the Charter of International Military Tribunal, Annex,
(1951) 82 U.N.T.S. 279. The extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not
justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly has also been
specified as a grave breach in Article 50 of the Geneva Convention I for the Amelioration
of the Condition of Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1948, 75
U.N.T.S. 31 and Article 51 of the Geneva Convention I1for the Amelioration of the
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug.
12, 1948, 75 U.N.T.S. 85.
115. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, (1998) U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/9, July 1,2002, Article 8 (2) (a). It is worth noting that at the time of
writing, there were 139 signatories and 88 States Parties to the Rome Statute, a treaty that
was the result of intense negotiations involving between delegations from over 150
countries and dozens of non-governmental organizations. Since July 1, 2002, many
States parties to the Statute have taken concrete measures to incorporate this treaty into
their own domestic legislation. These developments, reflecting the overall success this
major achievement in international criminal law, affirm the authoritative character of the
Statute of the International Criminal Court.
116. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, U.N. Doc. S/25704 at 36, annex (1993) and
S/25704/Add. 1,(1993) U.N. Doc. S/RES/827, Article 2 (d).
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4. Such property was protected under one or more of the Geneva
Conventions of 1949.
5. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that
established that protected status.
6. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with
an international armed conflict.
7. The perpetrator was aware of factual
circumstances that
117
conflict.
armed
an
of
existence
the
established
The first three elements have clearly been met by Israel's house
demolition policy: property was destroyed, the destruction was extensive,
it cannot be justified by military necessity and it was carried out
wantonly.18
Element 4 requires that the property in question was protected by
the Geneva Conventions. The houses destroyed punitively are expressly
protected by Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which
establishes that "[a]ny destruction by the Occupying Power of real or
personal property belonging individually or collectively to private
persons ... is prohibited, except where such destruction is rendered
absolutely necessary by military operations."' 1' 9 Article 33 (3) of the
same treaty establishes a concrete prohibition on the taking of reprisals
against the property of protected persons. The hundreds of houses that
have demolished or sealed punitively since 1967 were clearly protected
property under the Fourth Geneva Convention. Regarding element 5, the
Israeli authorities know that the homes demolished are those of the
relatives of persons who have, or who are suspected to have, committed
offenses. The affected persons are civilians. In this regard, the Israeli
authorities were aware that the civilian status of these people afforded
their property protection under the Fourth Geneva Convention.
Element 6 demands that the acts took place during an international
armed conflict. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
has made it clear that the term "international armed conflict" includes
military occupation.120 The West Bank and Gaza have been occupied by
Israel since 1967. It hardly needs stating that, in satisfaction of element

117. Article 8(2)(a)(iv), Elements of Crimes Preparatory Commission for the
International Criminal Court, PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2, 2 November 2000.
118. See previous section discussing grave breaches of the Fourth Geneva

Convention.
119. Supra note 1.
120. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, (1998)
A/CONF. 183/9, Elements of Crimes, footnote 34 to Article 8(2)(a).

U.N. Doc.
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7, the Israeli authorities are aware that they are occupying the lands
where the punitive house demolitions are carried out.
Israel's punitive house demolition policy constitutes one of the most
pervasive of war crimes. The actions taken under this policy meet all the
elements of the war crime of extensive destruction of property, not
justified by military necessity, and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.
The International Criminal Court has jurisdiction over this and other war
crimes, "in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as
part of a large-scale commission of such crimes." 1 2' Although this court
will only be able to prosecute crimes committed since the coming into
force of the Statute, it is abundantly clear that Israel's punitive house
demolition policy is ongoing. Since July 1, 2002, over two hundred
houses have been demolished as punishment by the Israeli military
forces.122 Under international criminal law, the Israeli authorities have
committed and continue to commit serious war crimes in the form of
punitive house demolitions.
C. House Demolitions: Collective Punishment as a War Crime
While grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions are the most
serious war crimes, other severe violations of the rules of international
humanitarian law are also categorized as war crimes. Article 6 of the
Nuremberg Charter described war crimes as "violations of the laws or
customs of war." The war crimes article of the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court includes, in addition to grave breaches of
the Geneva conventions, "other serious violations of the laws and
customs applicable in international armed conflict, within the established
framework of international law" as war crimes. 23 This section will
examine the question of whether Israel's violation of the prohibition
against collective punishment amounts to a war crime.
It has been shown that Israel's punitive house demolition policy
violates both Article 50 of the 1907 Hague Regulations and Article 33(1)
of the Fourth Geneva Convention because it punishes persons for crimes
they have not personally committed. Furthermore, the widespread
imposition of measures of collective punishment against protected
persons in occupied territories is a violation of an established norm of
customary international law. Section III has shown the customary status
of this prohibition, in particular as evidenced by the inclusion of a
121. Article8(1).
122. See
B'tselem,
http://www.btselem.org/english/HouseDemolitions/Statistics.asp
(last visited
2003).
123. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 115.
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prohibition of collective punishment in both Additional Protocols I and II
and in the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
Reinforcing the gravity of violating this norm, Jean Pictet has stated that
"other grave breaches of the same character as those listed in Article 147
can easily be imagined,"'' 24 following which he makes direct reference to
the Yugoslav Penal Code, which had added collective punishment to its
list of grave breaches.
Since the adoption of the punitive house demolition policy in 1967,
the Israeli authorities have punished thousands of persons for crimes
which were committed by others. The overwhelming majority of
demolitions and sealings have been clear acts of collective punishment.
The acts carried out under this policy are in violation of customary
international law and they are committed "as part of a plan or policy or
as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes."'' 2 5 There is a strong
case to be made that punitive house demolitions, which punish persons
on the basis of the archaic notion of collective responsibility, 126 may be
regarded as war crimes.
VI.

Conclusion

The protracted occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip has
brought with it a real and serious security threat for the State of Israel.
The preceding discussion has shown that in seeking to counter this threat,
the authorities have often acted in contravention of their obligations
under international humanitarian law. The Fourth Geneva Convention
makes it very clear that security measures concerning protected persons
are limited "at the most . . . to assigned residence or internment."'' 27 The
demolition of houses as a form of punishment, as carried out in the
Occupied Territories, is not permissible under international law. This
demolition policy has involved collective punishment on a massive scale.
Many thousands of Palestinians have been made homeless by the actions
of the Israeli army. Israel's Supreme Court has consistently validated
those actions and pointedly refused to address the collective punitive
nature of these acts. A review of international legal norms suggests that
punitive house demolitions, as part of an overall policy, are a grave
breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention and that these actions amount
124.

COMMENTARY TO THE FOURTH GENEVA, supra note 17, at 594.

125. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 115, Article 8 (1).
126. In 1969, the former Defence Minister Moshe Dayan answered affirmatively to
the question - regarding the demolition policy- of whether the Ministry of Defence was
"acting in such cases according to the principle of collective responsibility of the whole
family for one of its members"; cited in ISRAELI LEAGUE FOR HUMAN AND CIVIL RIGHTS,
THE SHAHAK PAPERS 15 (Adnan Amad ed., 1973).
127. Supra note I, Article 78.
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to war crimes.
The importance and centrality of the home in any society hardly
requires emphasis. In the words of thePresident of the Supreme Court of
Israel:
A person's home is not merely a roof over his head, but it is also a
means for the physical and social
location of a person, his private life
128
and his social relationships.

The demolishing or sealing of a house, therefore, not only destroys
one's place of residence, but also eradicates a focal-point of family and
social life. Moreover, and of critical importance in Palestinian society,
house demolitions are a means by which the Israeli authorities have
destroyed those peoples' links to their land. When this effect of punitive
demolitions is considered in conjunction with the similar effect of
administrative house demolitions and the destruction often associated
with military operations, it is possible to argue that these practices
amount to an effort by the Israeli authorities to sever Palestinian ties to
the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
The State of Israel has several legal obligations accruing to it under
both conventional and customary international law. These obligations
are called into question by the ongoing punitive house demolition policy.
In addition, the High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva
Convention have a duty to 'respect and to ensure respect for the
Convention in all circumstances."'129 [Emphasis added.] These parties
also have a legal duty to act in the face of the commission of grave
breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention. All States parties to this
convention must fulfill their obligations and take measures toward
holding accountable the perpetrators of these serious crimes.
Despite the strong and frequent censure from the international
community of Israel for its human rights record in the Occupied
Territories, it has continued to act with impunity for a number of years.
Punitive house demolitions are one of the most salient examples of
Israel's breach of its binding humanitarian law obligations. The recent
resumption of this demolition policy does not bode well for IsraeliPalestinian relations at a time when the parties are set to resume
important peace negotiations aimed at bringing about a resolution of this
perennial conflict.
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